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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to bring to discussion ways to diagnose university’s organizational intelligence 
and  to  put  forward  some  ways  of  measuring  it.  The  main  steps  pursued  refer  to  defining  and  describing  the 
organizational particularities of universities, which modulate in specific ways organizational intelligence strategies 
implementation, applying the organizational intelligence standards to universities, and examining the features of the 
intelligence markets. The manner in which the paradigm of the traditional university is being changed, and finally 
eliminated, by the social stimuli which claim for a different type of intelligence originating in universities and which 
are the beneficiaries of the new model of university, as an organization in-between – preserving its idiosyncratic 
position, but engaging in mutually profitable alliances, is an issue we address to. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Traditionally, universities were not seen as organizations. More likely, researchers referred to 
them as either institutions, carrying out a prominent social role (Readings, 1996), or communities, 
that is, “families” of people brought together, which were accepted for service in a certain social 
ceremony. This liberal philosophy of the modern age, regarding the university as an entity in 
charge with setting up (lat. instituere) and transmitting a national cultural heritage, is now in 
decline. The model of  the “corporate university” (Aronowitz, 2000) emerges not only in the form 
of private organizations offering highly specialized learning and educating particular skills (e.g., 
McDonald’s  University),  but  also  in  that  of  old,  reputed,  well-established  higher  education 
institutions, which mime the managerial and marketing practices of for-profit corporations. In 
Lyotard’s  (2004)  terms,  the  “University  of  Culture”  was  replaced  by  the  “University  of 
Excellence”, where the logic of performance is legitimating the university, under the pressure of 
academic capitalism (Clegg and Steel, 2002), which asks it to become competitive by marketing 
its  knowledge:  “knowledge  in  the  form  of  an  informational  commodity  indispensable  to 
productive power is already, and will continue to be, a major - perhaps the major - stake in the 
worldwide competition for power” (Lyotard, 2004). The “academic tribes” (Becher and Trowler, 
2001),  belonging  to  the  community  model  of  the  university,  can’t  survive,  as  specialized 
autarchies, in a society which aims at finding “overlapping patterns of unique narrowness”, as 
Campbell first argued two generations ago. Under these conditions, “colleges and universities can 
and must grow smarter” (Forest, 2002), as organizations seeking to maximize both their revenue 
and their prestige (Strober, 2006).  
Still, several particular conditions render universities as idiosyncratic institutions. In an attempt to 
systematize them, they are: 
Multiplicity  of  stakeholders.  Universities  were  reformed,  from  autonomous  communities  to 
organizations having stakeholders (Neave, 2002), that is, they no longer work for themselves, but 
have  to  comply  with  various  external  demands.  Nowadays,  a  university  usually  has  more 
stakeholders than a business of the same size would, which leads to a certain level of imprecision 
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“colleges and universities have vague, ambiguous goals and they must build decision processes to 
grapple with a higher degree of uncertainty and conflict”. This is a valid assumption for the 
public sector in general, since public goods are, by their nature, less well defined than private 
goods (Samuelson, 1954). Additionally, as Bourdieu and Johnson (1993) affirmed, universities 
are both positioned and position-taking. The position-taking actions of the national governments, 
as well as regional educational policies position universities but they, as well, adopt position-
taking strategies which  influence rankings  and  market shares, positioning them towards their 
stakeholders.   
Problematic hierarchies. Although universities tend to act as middle sized, or large corporations, 
in terms of their management and marketing decisions, their managers’ ability to hire or fire is 
limited.  More  than  that,  there  isn’t  any  clear  delimitation  between  the  technical  and  the 
institutional level of the hierarchy (Birnbaum, 1988). Professors, in charge with the technical 
issues of teaching and research, are also members of the administrative bodies, take part in the 
issuance of policies inside (University Senate, for instance), and outside (Ministry of Education, 
Parliament etc.) the university, which leads to an overlapping of perspectives that may not work 
in the university’s best interest, especially when there is a mismatch between the academic goals 
(to invest in excellence) and the administrative goals (to cut down costs, to attract more students, 
to drop examination on entry etc.). The mixture of public and private elements involved also 
complicates  the  process  of  academic  decision-making.  In  addition,  universities  are  loosely 
coupled systems, in terms of the matching of their strategies, posted on their web-sites, with their 
everyday practice.  In the arena, universities, moreover those from developing countries, play 
according to “globally institutionalized scripts of what a university ought to be” (Krücken, 2006). 
Romanian universities’ missions, for instance, employ the same “big words” taken from their 
reputed Western European or American counterparts. Still, managing a university according to its 
mission is a more complicated task than simply adhering to some models: 
 
“the leader of a bureaucracy makes rational decisions, the leader of a community of equals searches for 
common  ground  and  consensus,  the  leader  of  a  political  system  uses  power  to  craft  coalitions  and 
compromises, and the leader of a cultural system manipulates symbols to influence the way the organization 
creates meaning. A good academic leader is one who can do all these things, even when doing one of them 
is inconsistent with doing another.” (Birnbaum, 1998).  
 
Or, as one faculty dean said, “managing academics is like trying to herd cats. It is a nearly 
impossible  task,  since  they  all  have  minds  of  their  own  and  go  off  in  different  directions.” 
Reuniting lots of intelligent people, universities endanger their organizational intelligence.  
Professional  bureaucracies.  They  were  defined  by  Mintzberg  (1979)  as  inflexible  structures, 
which produce standardized outputs (i.e., skills), but are not good at changing their patterns, in an 
attempt to adapt to new demands. In other words, the “pigeonholing” process Mintzberg speaks 
about equals Argyris’s “single loop learning” (1999): the expert diagnoses the problem which 
needs  to  be  fixed,  and  then    provides  an  algorithm,  repetitive,  of  course,  of  addressing  it.  
Moreover, university professors prefer individual problem-solving, instead of cooperation, which 
again endangers the learning status of the organization.  
The transformation of university structures and patterns, in order to suit the new, entrepreneurial 
(Clark, 1998) paradigm, comprises, according to Brunsson and  Sahlin-Andersson (2000), three 
levels: construction of identity  (“who we are?”, and hence the organizational goal of “being 
special”), construction of hierarchy (passage from control to co-ordination, the engagement in 
common projects and in the building of a shared vision), and construction of rationality, i.e., of the  acquiring  of  adequate  means  for  rendering  the  university  accountable,  in  the  “audit 
society”(Power, 1997). University’s accountability is firmly connected with its autonomy, i.e. 
identity:  although,  unlike  traditional  times,  universities  have  stakeholders,  they  admit  not 
interfering with the knowledge-production of the university, on the condition they will benefit 
from  the  generated  knowledge,  and  that  this  opportunity  to  benefit  is  made  sufficiently 
transparent. So, societal pressures relate payment (universities, especially large research units 
generating knowledge are publicly funded) to performances. And universities must follow the 
rules of the game.  
The  construction  of  identity  implies  rendering  the  organizational  goals  explicit,  and  passing 
through  a  process  of  differentiation  which,  according  to  Clark  (1998),  is  the  sine  qua  non 
condition  of  a  university’s  existence:  being  unlike  the  others.  The  construction  of  hierarchy 
implies designing a sound formal structure around the organizational goals, which will constitute 
part of the university’s structural capital (Edvinsson and Malone, 1997). The paradigm of the 
entrepreneurial university imposes a specialization of management staff, as distinct from teaching 
and research staff, which leads to a clarification of the aforementioned problematic hierarchies. 
In order to fight pigeonholing, as a characteristic of professional bureaucracies which hampers 
organizational  learning,  project  cooperation  and  networking  is  also  included  in  the  structural 
capital,  as  well  as  the  university’s  ability  to  spill  over  knowledge  to  local  community,  to 
companies in the area, by means of technology transfer offices (Gibbons, 1994).  
The  accountability  of  the  university  is  strongly  connected  to  its  capacity  of  managing  and 
reporting the intangibles, as well as of creating and maintaining a market for them. The level of a 
university’s intellectual capital provides information on that university’s innovation rate and on 
the quality of its liaisons with the business environment (Fazlagic, 2005). In fact, the respect in 
which universities are thought to remain idiosyncratic, despite their advancement towards the 
status  of  organizations,  is  the  specificity  of  their  knowledge  outputs,  which  seem  opaque  to 
formal measurements. But, as Stewart (1995, in Fortune 137, p.157) remarked, “the assets that 
really  count  are  those  accountants  can’t  count.”  That’s  why  IC  measurement  and  reporting 
models in universities were proposed, in the last years, illustrating a trend of growing concern for 
the issues of university intangibles management (Sanchez et al., 2006). 
 
II.  Material and Methods 
 
Our research is based on the adaptation of a pilot questionnaire, aiming at determining the way in 
which a university is fit, as far as its organizational intelligence is concerned, which was tested, 
for the time being, on a population of 20 members of the research and teaching personnel of a 
Romanian university, having between 5 and 10 years with the organization.  
The premise we start from is that a university is intelligent if its strategy is an extrapolation of an 
algorithm with the “anytime” property, as it was defined by Boddy and Dean (1988). This means 
than an acceptable solution is always available, and the quality of the answer improves over time. 
In other words, given that individual intelligence can be defined as dynamic adaptation to niche 
survival (“the survival of the fittest”), organizational intelligence is the organization’s ability to 
apply something similar to genetic algorithms (Holland, 1975), in order to creatively recombine 
knowledge residing within individuals and relations. Knowledge, as reproduced in universities, is 
metameric: it is made of a sequence of segments enchained repetitively. The genetic algorithm 
encompassed by the organizational intelligence of the university should be able to identify the 
points  in  which  this  repetitive  knowledge  recombines,  and  to  artificially  recreate  those 
conditions. This way, knowledge evolves in the same manner life does.  Pushing the genetic analogy further, knowledge can be seen as composed of light chains (explicit 
knowledge) and heavy chains (tacit knowledge), disposed in the shape of an Y, whose junction 
region accounts for the flexibility of the construct. For an organization to artificially select the 
regions of light and heavy, respectively, chains to be activated, in the Y model of knowledge, a 
fitness  function  has  to  be  constructed.  Following  the  works  of  Albrecht  (2005),  the  fitness 
function we advance for universities is: 
 
F = SV x SF x CO x HS x A x KD x PP 
 
where  SV  stays  for  strategic  vision,  SF  for  shared  fate,  CO  for  change  orientation,  HS  for 
“Heart and Soul”, A for alignment, KD for knowledge deployment, and PP for performance 
pressure.  To  assess  the  strength  of  a  university’s  organizational  intelligence,  each  of  these 
parameters have to be evaluated, by means of a questionnaire.  
For strategic vision, the matters in focus are: 
•  The “strategic conversation” in the organization – plus or minus. 
•  The environmental scanning – plus or minus. 
•  Annual strategic review – present or absent. 
•  Value proposition – plus or minus. 
•  Statement of direction – present or absent. 
•  Correlation between statement of direction and key decisions – present or absent. 
•  Leaders’ identification and promotion – plus or minus. 
 
Similarly, for shared fate, other seven questions have to be addressed to: 
•  Plans  and  priorities  sharing  between  management  and  employees  –  present  or 
absent. 
•  Understanding of the organizational idea throughout the organization – plus or 
minus. 
•  Information sharing across departments – plus or minus. 
•  Sense or belonging – plus or minus. 
•  Employees – management partnership – present or absent. 
•  Employees’ belief in the organization success – plus or minus. 
•  Projected long lasting relationship with the organization – plus or minus. 
 
Change orientation is accounted for by: 
•  Issuance of new university services to keep up with the demand – plus or minus. 
•  Natural mechanisms to encourage innovation – present or absent. 
•  Employees’ stimulation to find creative ways to better do their jobs –  plus or 
minus. 
•  Permission to question the habitual way of getting things done – plus or minus. 
•  Bureaucracy – plus or minus. 
•  Willingness of the management to admit their mistakes and to cancel non-working 
strategies – plus or minus. 
•  Openness – plus or minus. 
 
“Heart and Soul” measures commitment in terms of: •  Overall quality of work life, as perceived by the employees – plus or minus. 
•  Management’s interests as perceived by the employees – plus or minus. 
•  Pride taken in belonging to the organization – plus or minus. 
•  Willingness,  from  the  part  of  the  employees,  to  spend  extra  effort  to  build 
organizational success – present or absent. 
•  Optimism regarding the future of employees’ career in the organization – plus or 
minus. 
•  Management commitment – present or absent. 
•  Perception of managers as role models – plus or minus. 
 
Alignment shows: 
•  Organizational structure appropriateness to the mission – plus or minus. 
•  Sense-making of rules and policies, as compared to priorities – plus or minus. 
•  Facilitation of employee performance – present or absent. 
•  Information systems as facilitators – plus or minus. 
•  Value creation – plus or minus. 
•  Authority delegation – plus or minus. 
•  Alignment  of  departments  missions,  as  to  facilitate  cooperation  –  present  or 
absent. 
 
Knowledge deployment is expressed by: 
•  Cultural processes of knowledge sharing – present or absent. 
•  Managers’ respect for employees’ knowledge skills – plus or minus. 
•  Porous organizational boundaries – plus or minus. 
•  Information systems knowledge flows support – plus or minus. 
•  Continuous  study  of  the  new  tendencies  at  the  managerial  level  –  present  or 
absent. 
•  Continuous learning programs support – present or absent. 
•  Accurate appreciation of employees’ tacit knowledge – plus or minus. 
 
Performance pressure takes into account: 
•  Clear understanding of roles and responsibilities, at all levels – present or absent. 
•  On-going  communication  of  performance  goals  and  expectations  –  present  or 
absent. 
•  Replacement of poorly performing employees – present or absent. 
•  Removal of failing managers – present or absent. 
•  Feedback to employees and recognition of their contributions – plus or minus. 
•  Employees’ perception that their work contributes to the organization’s success – 
plus or minus. 
•  Employees’ perception that career success is determined by job performance – 
plus or minus. 
 
Performance pressure on universities is reflected in their ability to shift the knowledge demand. A 
university disposes of two major demand-shifting factors: R, total R&D expenses, and M, total marketing expenses (Tassey, 2005). If x equals R/M, the performance function may be expressed 
as: 
 
ln Pi = δ ln xi + δ (α0 + α1 x1 + … + αnxn) + εi, i = 1…n. 
 
By solving the model,  a university may select  the x (i.e., the R&D and marketing expenses 
combination)  which  acceptably  suits  its  interests.  Intelligence  development  strategies  are 
mirrored by the R&D costs, while sound marketing strategies, on emerging knowledge markets, 
reflect in marketing costs. The sources of R&D intelligence can be direct or indirect, and can 
reside with the personnel or with the university. Direct sources residing with the personnel are: 
•  personal relationships  
•  visiting professorships 
•  business experience 
 
Direct sources residing with the university include: 
•  intellectual property 
•  titles in the library 
•  research reports 
 
Indirect sources residing with the personnel: 
•  consultants 
•  experts 
•  editorial boards 
•  retired executives. 
 
Indirect sources residing with the university: 
•  university market surveys 
•  university associations 
•  national and European reports. 
 
Under the heading of performance pressure universities should also include the selection and 
loyalizing of the appropriate researchers, given that they are in a continuous competition with the 











III.  Results 
 In the considered university, the selection and consolidation of the research staff are performed 
under uncertainty and risk, with asymmetrical information owned by the two parties, the university 
and the researcher, respectively, so they can be regarded as a principal-agent interaction. Each of 
them wants to maximize its utility function, and the main challenge is to find the allocation which 
best suits both interests. The model proposed by Jensen and Thursby (2002) takes into account 
three basic alternatives a researcher has: basic research, finalized by an article, applied research, 
finalized by a patent, and teaching activities, evaluated by assessing the quality of teaching. Each 
researcher (agent) is allocated by the university (principal) a wage w and a teaching effort e. If a is 
the  time  allocated  to  applied  research,  and  b  the  time  allocated  to  basic  research,  then  the 
constraint  is  a  +  b  +  e  =  1.  The  basic  research  and  the  teaching  activities  determine  the 
researcher’s wage, while applied research is a source of additional revenues. The researchers’ 
preferences  are  both  financial  and  non-financial,  consisting  in  research  satisfaction  and 
professional recognition, access to research networks, acceptance inside the groups of prestige 
which control the knowledge market, insertion in the knowledge networks on which their success 
depends (Cohen et al., 1998). The university’s interests are to maximize the fraction of the funds 
attracted by researchers (grants, etc.) which go into its budget, and to allocate wages and teaching 
effort as to maximize its utility. Studies conducted by Stephan et  al. (2002) have shown that 
applied and basic research are not substitutes, in other words, the fact that a researcher has more 
patents does not affect that researcher’s commitment to basic research, but a great number of 
published articles is likely to result in an increase in the volume of patents. But teaching and 
research, both basic and applied, are substitutes, meaning that an intensive research activity will 
necessarily decrease the quality of teaching.  
      Given these findings, a university which acts intelligently has to: 
a)  diminish, and finally annul the teaching effort of its efficient researchers. It might seem 
costly, on the short term, but it’s strategically cost effective. 
b)  encourage  applied  research,  by  investing  prestige  capital  in  it.  Currently,  at  least  in 
Eastern  Europe  universities,  exclusively  basic  research  is  taken  into  account  for 
promotion, i.e., for prestige accumulation, situation which puts researchers in front of a 
university-induced  choice:  academic  prestige,  or  money  and  business  expertise? 
Entrepreneurial  universities  encourage  spin-offs,  community-led  and  community-for 
research,  so  this  fake  dilemma  has  to  be  solved  in  favour  of  the  free  choice  of  the 
researcher who, able to opt for two equally reputable activities, decides according to the 
time investment he/she is disposed to make, and to the particular interests he/she has at 
the moment. 
Talking about prestige, universities must also take into account that, although knowledge is a 
type of good whose allocation is a non-Pareto optimal one, meaning that, not being a limited, 
tangible resource, the fact that one takes “more” doesn’t leave the others with “less”, it still is a 
positional good (Hirsch, 1977), as well as education. The ones who dispose of more knowledge, 
or are more educated, are better positioned than the others. So, we may infer from here that the 
amount of knowledge a university disposes of is directly correlated with the market share of the 
respective university. In practice, yet, things are more subtle than that.  
 
IV.  Discussions 
 
University positioning mechanisms have suffered radical changes, especially in Eastern European 
countries,  where  the  passage  from  the  command-driven  to  the  demand-driven  (Radó,  2001) 
regime was abrupt. Higher education, as an instance of social sorting, desirable because it granted access to some privileges (Bratianu and Lefter, 2001), becomes, nowadays, a victim of its own 
success. The liberalization of the market, and the acknowledgement of the fact that not only 
structure follows strategy, but also money follow students, has turned higher education into a 
mass process, which made universities compete for “customers” (Newson, 2004) and adapt to the 
consumerist attitude (“What can I do with my degree?”) of their students. In other words, they are 
preoccupied  to  sell  the  ivory  tower.  There  occurs  the  commodification  of  knowledge,  “the 
phenomenon in which non-material activities are being traded for money” (Lubbers, 2001). 
Still, “the consumer is always right” is a dangerous assumption for higher education (McMurtry, 
2004), given that universities have also third party beneficiaries (Etzkowitz et al., 2002). So, in 
the dispute between acropolis and agora, the accent should be moved on some other important 
elements which compose a university’s intelligence market. 
First, universities are the most representative buyers of knowledge (Fritsch, 2003). The payment 
for this knowledge can be real (fees for database access, journal subscriptions, conference fees, 
etc.), or symbolic: citations, works in honour of a researcher, etc. By exercising this role in the 
economy,  universities  attract  knowledge  which  is  locally  unavailable,  and  thus  enrich  the 
knowledge  market.  Their  intelligence,  in  this  case,  plays  the  role  of  the  inquisitive  mind, 
“digging” for new (in the sense of not yet disseminated) knowledge. 
Second, universities are still expected to train an intellectual labour force corresponding to some 
standards of the industry which, based on previous experience, has configured a profile of the 
university graduate, on fields of expertise. Given that science and society change, but a different 
pace  (Nowortny,  2001),  traditional  universities  experienced  a  conflict  between  their  elitist 
stagnation and the changes in the skills “traded” outside, on the labour market. The Mode-1 
knowledge production, for the sake of disinterested science (Rip, 2002) belonging to the elitist 
university,  where  the  two  roles  –  social  and  research  were  complementary,  was  replaced  by 
Mode-2 knowledge production (Etzkowitz, 2002), were they are rather overlapping.  
Third,  universities  engage  in  partnerships  with  industry,  in  order  to  mitigate  the  risks  of 
producing knowledge which has no immediate applicability, and to increase the area of coverage 
of the university (Porter et al., 2005). Universities support their researchers to launch their own 
research companies, and the so-called “science entrepreneurship” (Lehrer and Asakawa, 2004) 
has become a rather common practice of these uni-business joint ventures. The success of these 
ventures is questionable from the point of view of the mono-specialization of their owners, and of 
their lack of real life marketing and management practice (Bower, 2003).  
A danger still exists, in this market dynamics. A new model of market success, as it was, mutatis 
mutandis, that of the traditional university, is being embodied by the research university. But, as 
both funding and human resources for research are limited (here is the paradox – knowledge, 
which is unlimited, is still obtained with limited resources), not all universities can achieve the 
status of research universities. Most of them will try to emulate this model, in order to obtain a 
better market position, and this results in selling expectations which are not properly supported 
(Meek, 2001). More than that, focalizing on just one segment, being it elitist and well positioned 
as far as university intelligence is concerned, creates the risk of leaving the market unsaturated. It 
is more recommendable, for the universities, to specialize and to prioritize their interests so as to 
cover all the segments of the market.  
In the present environment, highly competitive and turbulent, there is no golden standard towards 
which the strategies of all universities should converge. From the marketing point of view, the 
university intelligence equals the ability to determine the adequate marketing mix for appealing 
to prospective students, without selling overestimated expectations and without neglecting the other major functions a university has in relation to its external environment: antenna for remote 
knowledge, supplier of qualified workforce, and science-based partner for industry.  
 
V.  Conclusions 
 
Universities currently adopt corporate-like behaviours, being, thus, influenced by the same need 
to develop their organizational intelligence which has recently become a widespread practice in 
the business world. In fact, they should have been pioneers in the field, given that, although they 
are losing the monopoly on knowledge, universities still are accredited knowledge producers, so 
they are inherently involved in the field of intelligence supply and trading. It was not the case, 
particularly because, traditionally, the economy of higher education was far from being a free 
one, as it benefited from a sort of knowledge protectionism, from unaccountable autonomy. Now, 
as they pass from a command-driven (the requirements of the nation-state, for instance, whom 
universities, as institutions, have served) to a demand-driven (based on market laws) regime, 
universities must focus on fostering their organizational intelligence development strategies.  
The  first  step  of  the  process,  an  on-going  one,  is  the  evaluation  of  the  present  status  of 
organizational  intelligence.  Since  organizational  intelligence  is  seen  as  an  evolving,  mobile 
feature, its measurements can’t, obviously, be static. So, universities have to design adequate 
functions  whose  variables  are  environment-sensitive  and,  by  optimizing  these  functions,  to 
ensure that they have reached an acceptable level of organizational intelligence, a basis for future 
development.  Of  course,  both  the  internal  and  the  external  environment  of  a  university  are 
complicated and complex, not to mention their idiosyncrasy, but, in order to model the dynamic 
equilibrium needed between the two, we isolated one main force representative for each of the 
domains.  The  university  can  control  its  internal  performance  by  R&D  expenditure,  while  its 
external performance is controlled by marketing expenditure. The optimizing problem is, thus, 
reduced to determining the optimal ratio between the two, in order to assess the marketability of 
university  research  and  to  avoid  the  trap  of  knowledge  for  knowledge  sake,  which  is  not  a 
solution, any longer, in the present economic context.  
Traditionally  seen  as  an  “extraordinary”  good,  knowledge  was  asserted  a  particular  regime, 
which didn’t involve any utility function. But now, when knowledge is the ordinary good of the 
knowledge economy, universities must be aware of the fact that their researchers have a life 
utility function, and knowledge production implies some opportunity costs, which have to be 
thoroughly considered. In order words, expenses with knowledge production have to provide an 
adequately high return on investment.  
From the marketing side, a forecast on the university’s position, as compared to what it used to 
be, is difficult to  advance. What can be said, though, is that it  would  be recommendable to 
enlarge the debate between the acropolis and agora, that is, preserve the university’s aura of 
scientific expertise, by not turning it into a slave of the market tendencies, lusting for money and 
indulging in research apathy, and adopt a tuning strategy, adjusting in due time, by minimum 
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